

NRAO ONLINE 7 Martyn-Ella Horne Scandal (1940-1941) and Collapse in Europe (1954)

Sir FWG White, in 1984 as he read the Intelligence Report of the Military Intelligence of the Australian Army and the Commonwealth Investigation Branch [CIB] in 1941 (precursor of ASIO-Australian Security Intelligence Organisation] from April 1941:

Boris Schedvin tells me that information found in the National Archives shows suspicion of Martyn to be much more serious than I imagined so [in 1941] ...

This [suspicion of a discretion with Mrs Horne] is confirmed by the release of confidential papers [by the CIB] after 30 [sic 43] years. I believed in 1941 there was no foundation [for the accusations against Martyn].

The complex and tragic events that lead to the humiliation of David Martyn in March 1941 (age 35) have only been revealed in detail by Schedvin (1987) and briefly by Home (2000). Schedvin based his account on the security file CRS A367, file C/65512 “Mrs David Horne”, referred to as the EHSF- Ella Horn Security File¹. (The title of the report is “Confidential enquiry in regard to the association of Dr David Martyn with Mrs Ella Horne of German birth” dated April 1941—no day—by the Intelligence Section of the General Staff – Australian Army and the Commonwealth Intelligence Service) The present authors have used this source, arriving at slightly different conclusions concerning the reaction of various Australian security agencies to the level of security risk associated with David Martyn in 1941.²

¹ The file of 14 pages consists of two summaries from 8 April 1941 after an interview with Ella Horne, the previous evening; this was carried out by M.J. Keefe, Inspector 1st Class of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch (CIB), along with his colleague of the CIB Barnwell, and Major Wade, (General Staff, Army) of Military Intelligence (MI -Army). Keefe and Wade provided separate, lengthy summaries with copious details of events from Christmas 1940 to April 1941. The Keefe report was addressed to the Intelligence Section of the General (Army) Staff, Eastern Command (Sydney), while the Wade report was addressed to the Assistant Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters Melbourne. On 4 April 1941, D.R.B. Mitchell of CIB (Inspector), Sydney, provided a report to the Director of the CIB in Canberra based on the interview with Diana Partman from 2 April 1941 (transcript of three pages). In 1945, the CIB became a part of the CIS (Commonwealth Intelligence Service), evolving into the modern ASIO in 1949 (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

² White wrote an undated report (in 1983, 13 years after his retirement in May 1970). This report is based almost entirely on the Martyn personnel file in the NAA, A8520, PH/MAR/12. White’s text was placed in the Australian Academy of Science Archive as a “confidential document”. In mid-2017, the authors secured the permission of the Executive Committee of the Academy (EXCOM) to view and use the contents; in addition, the confidential status of the file was removed. We are indebted to Dr Anna-Maria Arabia, Chief Executive of the Australia Academy of Science for her assistance in securing the right to access this file. Further details of the contents of this White document are provided in Additional Note 1.

Ella Kruse Horne was born in 1902 (four years older than David Martyn) in Hamburg as Ella Sofia Johanna Kruse. After WWI, she had completed secondary education. From the EHSF (Ella Sofia Security File), the Keefe (CIB, Commonwealth Investigation Branch) report of 8 April 1941: "... [O]n account of the depression [in Germany] she went to America on the advice of her father, where she married an American who died shortly after the marriage." Her ill fortune at marriage continued after marrying an English actor, David Horne, in the US. After the family moved back to the UK, a daughter was born in about 1934. Before coming to Australia, she applied for a divorce from her husband on the grounds of adultery; she claimed he was at fault. In about August 1940, she decided to escape the war in Europe (the Battle of Britain was just beginning) and to improve the environment for her young daughter. There were additional reasons: she wanted to avoid being caught up in the divorce proceeding and she feared she might be interned as an enemy alien, causing her to lose custody of her English daughter. Schedvin (1987) has suggested that the funds for her move to Sydney as well as a yearly allowance of £600 were provided by her ex father-in-law (Chairman of the Prudential Assurance Company and a theatre owner in London). Mrs Horne and her young daughter travelled to Australia on the S.S. *Strathmore*, which had become a troop ship on 31 March 1940. (Presumably, on passages away from the UK, civilians were accommodated.) Before sailing, British intelligence informed the Australian authorities that she was believed to be "Pro-Fascist"; when she arrived in Australia she told acquaintances that some of her friends had been interned in the UK. Although, she had not been investigated, the UK authorities thought the Australians would be "interested". Clearly, the Commonwealth Investigation Branch (CIB) was waiting as she arrived.

The mother and daughter arrived in Sydney on 13 October 1940. In the next five months the CIB spent lots of effort following her, checking on friendships made on board the *Strathmore* and in Sydney, as well as her financial dealings. The CIB issued two reports about her contacts "with foreigners and Service Officers" (22 October 1940 and 10 February 1941). The CIB did not know the nature of Martyn's top-secret research on radar, only that he had a very responsible sensitive position at the CSIR. They asked themselves the question: "Could Ella Horne be a Nazi spy?" during this period of conflict in Europe. (The Blitz would only end 5 months later.) All Germans were suspect.

In the meantime, Diana Parnham³ had met Ella through a mutual friend in Sydney in late 1940. The friend said to Diana: "Come round and have cocktails and meet this woman. She is of theatrical stock and you will probably have something in common. She is living opposite you and does not know a soul." [This was within a few weeks of her arrival.] I know her very well."

³ All references to Diana Parnham are based on the 2 April 1941 interview she had with Inspector Mitchell of the CIB.

At Christmas, Ella's daughter was ill. She originally planned on going to Katoomba. Apparently, Diana knew about hotels in the Blue Mountains, recommending instead the Lapstone Hill Hotel⁴, 40 miles from Sydney at the foot of the Blue Mountains, only 2-3 km from Glenbrook. Lapstone would have provided some relief from the oppressive heat of the Australian summer

Diana pointed out this location was "quieter than Katoomba" and more suitable for the six year old. While at the hotel, Ella told Diana her divorce was final, having received a copy of the decree nisi. Dave Horne had become engaged to another woman

On 20 December 1940, Martyn went on leave (he had intended to leave the previous day, postponing for urgent duties at RPL). He also went to the Lapstone Hill Hotel.

Diana accompanied Ella to Lapstone. Diana was careful to point out to the CIB that the meeting between Ella and Martyn was completely coincidental. "He came up with another fellow and she fell for Dr Martyn, not the other fellow. It was purely an accidental happening. I do think, in view of the fact that she met him and had access definitely to his flat (in Darlinghurst, Sydney), she had access to any information that he might foolishly give away."

David Martyn met Ella Horne on at least two occasions at the Lapstone Hill Hotel, first at Christmas 1940 and for a weekend in early 1941; apparently Ella and her daughter stayed there for at least two months; she departed for Potts Point in Sydney on 18 February 1941. Keefe and Wade interviewed the owner of the Lapstone Hill Hotel and his "hostess", Miss Higginson, who had introduced Martyn to Ella. Since she was recognised to be German by the other guests, she was regarded with suspicion. Danger signals were already apparent (Keefe report): "Miss Higginson ... was candid in her opinion that Mrs Horne expressly set herself out to lure or fascinate men guests, and actually was seen about the surrounding bush with different men; up to the early hours of the morning, and has very grave doubts as to her morals. She saw Dr Martyn in her company ..." Also in this period, Mrs Horne was observed having liaisons with several other guests at the hotel, Lt Ralph Nicholson, an army officer from Wallgrove Camp. Another regular was Stanley Reed (formerly Ratz), originally a Polish Jew, who told Keefe: "He regarded her as a very attractive young woman, and that his interest in her was purely sexual. He intimated that he was well aware of her association with a Military Officer, and considered that [Nicholson] was only a passing fancy and that this could be said of his association with Mrs Horne."

Martyn returned to the hotel in early 1941 for a weekend, date uncertain. Likely, the reason was to continue the affair with Ella. By this point, the hotel began to look like a *Pink Panther* film with at least two "Inspector Clouseaus" (intelligence personnel) apparently unaware that the other was there on the same mission, watching Martyn. On 15 February 1941, CIB

⁴ The Lapstone Hill Hotel was a fashionable hotel, opened in 1936, that attracted people "recuperating from town life or pleurisy or pneumonia". The property consisted of six hectares of lawns, flowers, fruit and vegetable gardens.

personnel visited Lapstone Hill Hotel where they met Flying Officer Gray of Air Force Intelligence. At this time, both the CIB personnel and Gray noticed that the Army officer Nicholson remained Ella's prominent "amour".

At this time, the role of Diana, the former actor, became muddled. She started her interview with Mitchell in a positive tone: "I personally cannot possibly suspect this woman. She is a big, blond, German woman and a German at heart ...". Diana would likely be described in the modern era as "flaky" (eccentric). In describing her day-to-day relation with Ella, Diana told Mitchell: "She does not give me credit for very many brains because she thinks I am a little too attractive and I have been on the stage for years and stage people are not very brainy. I have a retentive memory." Numerous statements made by Diana were contradictory.

Diana reported some provocative details of reported statements made by Martyn to Ella Horne: "I would only like to spend my life with you. You are the one woman for me. You are so intelligent", and so on. Then he sort of cooled off and did not ring up and she saw him on vague occasions "... He comes to see her when she rings him up. They are still seeing each other."

Diana reported to Army Intelligence in February that Ella Horne was visiting Martyn's flat (she did not have a key). One of the reasons for these visits was that Martyn planned to accompany Madsen to the US and then the UK within a few months, "going overseas on this important job". Diana reported to the Army [MI] at the end of January or early February, talking to Major [sic, Lt. Col] Powell. "He listened and I told him everything I knew."

This date of early February 1941 can be related to the receipt of a mysterious letter of 5 February 1941 from Martyn to Rivett, CEO of CSIR.⁵ This letter reveals a sudden and likely serious conflict between Martyn and his boss Madsen. In Martyn's handwritten letter to Rivett, he complained about the three-month delay in payment of a salary increment in 1940. The amount in question was £ 50, compared to a yearly salary of about £ 1200. There are two surprises in this letter: (1) the cause of the delay in salary adjustment is not explained and (2) Martyn reveals that in early February, Madsen would lead the delegation to the UK and the US, not himself. Thus, Martyn knew about the demotion, but mentioned it almost as an afterthought.

Martyn wrote to Rivett:

When I became aware some time ago that Prof Madsen was withholding approval I mentioned the matter to him [he was reluctant to answer] at first and was rather evasive. Eventually, I did unearth his motives and felt immediately that I ought to see you [Rivett] and discuss the matter, as the hold-up was likely to be misinterpreted by you and the Executive ... In the circumstances I now feel very concerned at being penalized by the Executive and am forced to wonder if there is any connection between the two matters [the unmentioned cause and the subsequent late increment]. I

⁵ NAA, A8520, PH/MAR/12, Part 2. Personnel file of David Martyn.

mentioned recently what had happened to Prof Madsen and he expressed annoyance but also a desire to have nothing more to do with the matter as he was “**sick and tired of it**”[our emphasis]. This, I must say, seemed rather an unfair attitude ... If, as seems possible, Professor **Madsen may go abroad** [our emphasis --That is Martyn had already been replaced as head of mission to the UK], I feel the urgent desirability of cleaning the matter up. I would feel in a most invidious position, during his absence, if I had to assume the complete responsibility for the Division here, while he had still possibly left doubts in the minds of the Executive of my fitness for so responsible a position.

Rivett responded on 10 February 1941, suggesting to Martyn that he let the matter drop. “The position is certainly not an easy one.” Martyn insisted that the Executive look into the matter. Rivett responded again on 13 February 1941; the Executive would have to investigate since “there is a conflict of evidence which has to be resolved ...” Then, the story goes cold in the personnel file. The next entries concern the conflicts which arose later in 1941 as the position of Chief of the Division of RP was to be abolished. The alleged direct report by Diana Parnham to Military Intelligence (at the end of January or early February) occurred about the same time as the conflict between Martyn and Madsen. Did Madsen get an early warning from the intelligence services that Martyn had associated with a German woman and had been heard bragging about his responsible position and the impending trip overseas?

The timing of the next events is murky. Twice in the Parnham interview she mentioned the circumstances of Martyn’s hearing of the news about the cancellation of his trip to the US and the UK. At some period in January or February, Diana reported: “David Martyn had cancelled his trip. [Ella] said he was terribly upset, and said, ‘it is all to do with this important job. He is furious with everybody.’ He had apparently told her why he was not going.” In early March 1941, Diana told Mitchell: “I think David Martyn has the wind up a bit. He is not content as he was since his job was cancelled [the visit overseas]. It was set that he would go to America and then to England within ten days. That was about a month ago and quite suddenly, soon after I took the report to [MI, Military Intelligence], they [MI?] sent a man from Melbourne to investigate it. Then the job was cancelled.” This statement implies that Diana’s report to the army was a decisive factor in the ultimate fate of Martyn in March 1941.

At the beginning of April, a number of key events occurred. By 2 April 1941, the CIB was convinced that Diana was a reliable source. Mitchell: “... Miss Parnham is intelligent and has a good memory and would be most valuable in keeping Mrs Horne under the closest scrutiny ... [T]he information furnished by Miss Parnham I believe to be substantially correct.” Mitchell decided to conduct a long interview on 2 April. A complication was that David Martyn knew that Diana had talked to the CIB. “He does in his heart suspect me, but on the face of it he cannot because I am so friendly with Mrs Horne. He is no fool. He is a brilliant man, and he looks at me in a very shrewd way. I do feel that he suspects me.” The CIB and the MI determined that both Martyn and Mrs Horne knew they were being watched; as an alien, her

post was censured. As expected, the CIB determined that Mrs Horne and Martyn did not meet in this period, since they kept Mrs Horne continuously under surveillance as well as Martyn's flat.

After the interview, Mitchell summed up his impressions:

Following Miss Parnham's disclosures, I had commenced investigations to establish what associations existed between Dr Martyn and Mrs Horne as I consider it most indiscreet, considering Mrs Horne's origin, for any person in a highly confidential position to contact her at all or allow such a person to visit [Martyn's] flat.

Then on the next day (3 April 1941) MI took over the investigation. MI and the CIB were frustrated that they were not allowed to interview Martyn.⁶ Finally, Wade (MI), Keefe and Barnwell interviewed Ella on 7 April 1941 in her flat (Flat 87 Cahore, Macleay Street in Potts Point) for a lengthy interview. Both Keefe and Wade wrote reports, differing in emphasis.

Keefe wrote:

I formed the opinion that whilst Mrs Horne's interests are British her sympathies are naturally German. She was quite candid in admitting her friendships with the persons previously referred to herein, including Dr Martyn, but stated that she did not know where he was employed. From her manner and general attitude when mentioning Dr Martyn's name, I formed the opinion that for some time she has been aware that enquiries in regard to her association with the doctor were being made or probably likely to be made. Mrs Horne appears to be very fond of her child who at the moment is ill.

Keefe summarised his report with a number of points:

(1) Mrs Horne's interests are with the British Empire, and her explanation ... setting out her reasons for visiting Australia, is correct.

(2) She has no connection whatever with the Nazi regime other than that her father and brother are in Germany. At the same time I consider her to be German at heart and definitely sympathetic to her country ... I feel that she would not commit any act that would jeopardise her livelihood, liberty, or commit any act that may part her from her child.

⁶ Wade wrote on 8 April to Army Headquarters in Melbourne: "... [A]s the fact that he [Martyn] was not to be connected with the enquiry, any approaches for information in regard to him were essentially restricted. The question of his loyalty or otherwise is a matter of opinion and [while my opinion is based on second hand information] as he [Martyn] has not been interviewed..."

(3) There is no evidence to substantiate the allegation that Mrs Horne was aware that Dr Martyn was carrying out secret and scientific work in connection with radio detection of submarines.

(4) It is apparent that Dr Martyn was on very intimate terms with Mrs Horne, but taking into account Mr Wetherill's and Professor Bailey's confidential opinion [see Additional Note 1], I do not consider that Martyn had given Mrs Horne any secret information, but possibly talked freely about the magnitude and importance of his position at the University.

(5) Mrs Horne, it would seem, makes a point of seeking the company of men, and her moral life is, as far as men are concerned, at least doubtful.

Wade was far more censorious of Martyn and Mrs Horne in his report of the interview of Mrs Horne on 7 April 1941. Dr Martyn had told Mrs Horne (according to Diana Parham) that he was "on most important experimental work for the Government and that was work of great magnitude." Wade "confessed" that he, Keefe and Barnwell had planned to carry out "an unofficial search" of Mrs Horne's flat, but this was not possible "owing to a sick child the flat was not empty".

Wade reported:

Mrs Horne was entirely untruthful and deceitful during the interview whilst at the same time endeavouring to create the impression of being frank ... Her pretence to be anti-Nazi is strangely made without any enthusiasm ... [The interviewers believe that] she has not been deliberately sent to Australia by the Nazi regime or any English sympathizers; there is every justification for considering that she is wholly sympathetic with Germany and had been accepted as such by the Germans ... Although emphasising that she did not desire to meet Service officers she was nevertheless successful in cultivating officers from each of the services plus a civil servant [Martyn] of some degree of importance. Unquestionably Mrs Horne is fond of male company and owing to a certain amount of physical charm and a supposedly loose moral outlook, many males have sought her company. The affair with Dr Martyn developed whilst he was at Lapstone in January 1941 with another women friend, a Mrs A. Wilston, divorcee, who allegedly divorced her husband to marry Martyn. This affair has now ceased temporarily at least.⁷

⁷ Keefe had also interviewed several prominent friends and colleagues of Martyn. John Wetherill from the PMG described the musical talents of Martyn, an accomplished pianist with many musical friends. Although, "definitely fond of women's company and likely to brag about his personal qualifications and the magnitude and importance of his position", he had no doubts about his loyalty. Professor Victor Bailey of Sydney University agreed with the latter opinion but was quite critical. Although Bailey had known Martyn for ten years and even helped get him his position at Sydney University in the RRB, he had not been on friendly terms with DFM for two years. (This was ironic, due to their famous papers of 1934 about the Luxembourg effect- radio propagation.) The reasons were: (1) "That he considered

Wade continued:

[I]t seems that he is exceedingly vain and a man who will satisfy his vanity at almost any cost. There seems to be reliable evidence that in addition to telling Mrs Horne about this experiment and secret work he has also told a Mrs Wardlaw. I consider that he [is] more international than national and without any particular loyalties to a cause or to any high moral standards. To gratify [his] sexual urge, apparently a well-developed characteristic, and to pander to his own vanity, he has certainly mentioned his association with important secret work but is it doubtful if has ever compromised his actual nature of the experiments being carried out. However, it may be accepted that it is common knowledge that he is on important secret work and that if the enemy intelligence section has any degree of efficiency some attempt will be made sooner or later to obtain details. During the source of the enquiry which has taken many turns, and despite the time spent on it covered a wide range, information was received to the effect that one or two persons closely associated with the work have extreme left ideas and associations. [These fears of member of the CPA, Communist Party of Australia, were justified; see Goss and McGee, 2009.]

Thus, Wade was suggesting that Martyn had made himself a security risk by his intemperate behaviour.

When did the CSIR Executive become aware of these events? Schedvin (1987) has suggested that MI informed Madsen or Rivett in early April, a week or so before the 17 April 1941 meeting of the RAB. However, we have shown that already in early February, there was friction between Martyn and Madsen and the decision to block Martyn's trip to the UK was likely. An additional clue as to this date was the first meeting of the RAB in 1941 on 10 March (previous meeting was 17 December 1940). By coincidence, Fred White also arrived from New Zealand on this day in March.⁸ The minutes of the 10 March meeting (9th meeting of the RAB) began with a disingenuous claim: "The Chairman [Madsen] reported that since the last meeting of the Board, difficulties had arisen in connection with the proposal to send David Martyn abroad. Finally, it has been arranged that he himself would go as leader (with some title such as Director of Scientific Research Liaison – Physics and Engineering)." He was to take Munro, Webster and Nicholls with him for assistance with liaison duties in the UK and the US. Professor Fred White (Christchurch, age 36), who had been approached in late 1940 to replace Martyn (during his planned trip) as Chief at RPL, would now be asked to take over the Chairmanship of RAB while Madsen was overseas. The "difficulties" with David Martyn were irrelevant compared to the

Martyn claimed credit for professional work, the copyright of others, to which he was not entitled and (2) Martyn's association with a married woman whose husband was a friend of [Bailey and his wife]." Perhaps this person was Mrs A. Wilston, see the main text.

⁸White was to return to New Zealand in May 1941, as his family moved from Christchurch to Melbourne. He had various positions in CSIR and CSIRO: Chairman of RAB, Vice-Chair of RAB, Chief of RPL, Assistant Executive Officer CSIR, CEO of CSIRO (1949), Deputy Chairman CSIRO, Chairman CSIRO (1959-1970).

turmoil in the direction of the RPL, after Martyn's dishonourable actions of the previous months.

By the next meeting of the RAB on 17 April 1941, many developments had occurred in the management of the RPL. Fred White had been in Australia for a month. Madsen was to leave for the US and the UK on 25 April via NZ.⁹ A major concern at the April meeting was the length of time the New Zealand government would allow him to remain in Australia. The hope was that he would be allowed to stay nine months; in fact, he was to remain at CSIR and CSIRO for the following 29 years. The main item of business was described in the widely distributed minutes as item 2, "Consideration was given to certain reports." The official copies of the minutes contained details of item 2, available to the current authors:

Consideration was given to a report on certain private associations of Dr. Martyn [/'*affaire* Horne]. It was decided to inform him that while he occupied his present responsibilities, he could not be permitted to associate with people whom were considered to be dubious by the Intelligence Services.

Dr Martyn's tendency to give forecasts that were too optimistic was also mentioned. Professor Madsen, however, stated that Professor White was fully informed of this danger and could look after it. It was agreed that statements or recommendations upon which action of importance by the Services or the PMG Department might be based, should be received only after confirmation by Professor White.

In fact Martyn had become *persona non grata* at the PMG Laboratory under the direction of S. H. Witt. Schedvin (1987) has described this in a graphic manner:

In such sensitive circumstances David Martyn's personality, acted as a catalyst, raising temperatures within the PMG and the Services. Martyn was quick, impulsive and intrusive. His great intellectual gifts could not assuage a deep sense of personal injury. His own sensitivity left him uncertain in dealings with his peers; he was unforgiving in his hatred of those he thought had done him harm [in 1941]. [The effects of these events continued until his death by suicide in 1970.]

The repercussions of the events of March and April 1941 continued to reverberate throughout the CSIR. Schedvin (1987, page 257) has written: "Madsen [about to leave Australia until December 1941], Rivett and Julius [adopted] a censorious view. In Rivett's opinion, Martyn had contravened a sacred trust. Even to be associated with a security investigation was tantamount to betrayal of the code of conduct expected of a top scientist." Naturally, the Australian military authorities were well aware of the situation since the MI had led the investigation. The

⁹ He was to stay in NZ until 7 May 1941 when he went by air to the US, remaining there until late June. From late June to November he was in the UK, returning via the US. His plane left Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, a few hours before the Japanese onslaught. He was back in Australia on 10 December 1941.

dates on which the CSIR was brought into the picture are unclear. As we have seen, Martyn's dismissal from the overseas trip was reported to the RAB during the 10 March 1941 meeting. By the time of the 17 April meeting, his poor judgement was discussed in detail. By the time of the 11th meeting of the RAB on 21 May 1941, Madsen was overseas and White was the Chairman. (Martyn did join the meeting to give a RPL report; he was not at an RAB meeting until mid-1942, see below.)

On 14 May 1941, David Martyn wrote a "*mea culpa*" letter to David Rivett¹⁰:

White has passed to me your comments on my letter to him. He assures me that I misunderstood his comments regarding integrity.

I have no difficulty whatever in giving the Board the assurance it demands that I shall not associate with any person suspected by the Intelligence Services. My only difficulties are that I have not been asked so far to give this, and no one has indicated to me (except after an apparently prolonged investigation [Affair Ella Horne]) the person or persons who are suspect by the Intelligence.

In the absence of such indication, I have naturally assumed that British citizens allowed to remain at large are not considered dangerous. Neither wild horses nor any unauthorized person would draw from me information of the slightest value to an enemy agent.

In the present instance, which apparently concerns Mrs David Horne, a British subject (certainly of German origin), known to mutual friends in Scotland, daughter-in-law of the Chairman of Prudential Assurance Company, and anxious to rent my flat at the time I was booked to go abroad [he had planned to leave Sydney in mid-March 1941], I would not nominally have anticipated trouble. But if she was suspect, surely I could have been informed of the fact [clearly no intelligence service in the world would have contemplated such action].

May I assure you personally, and the Radiophysics Board [sic not RAB], that I shall dissociate myself completely and immediately from any person suspect, rightly or wrongly, by the Intelligence Services. In order to help me scrupulously observe this assurance, could it be arranged that the Intelligence be advised to inform me immediately if the [sic, they] find me associating unwillingly with any person suspect by them?

On 23 May 1941, Rivett replied, completely rejecting the last unworkable suggestion. He suggested to let things stand as they were, taking no action to involve the CIB or MI.

¹⁰ NAA A8520/MAR/ 1941

To write to the Intelligence Services along the lines suggested [by you] could do no good: indeed the mere fact of doing so might seem to imply that I expected their officers to keep you under observation and to note all your human associations. I do not, and I am unwilling even to give a hint that they should. So, unless you press it, I am taking no further action. [Martyn never replied to this request.]

During the next months, Rivett and White agonized over possible plans to reorganise the laboratory with and without Martyn. On 1 August 1941, Rivett cabled Madsen in London: "Finally convinced must remove Division Chief otherwise disaster threatens collaboration other bodies [PMG, NSWGR, the military]. Alternatives you take him your team or find him job elsewhere [in] England." Madsen was not having this solution at all; he replied to Rivett: "Recommend transfer [Martyn as liaison] to Canada, leaving Munro concentrate on America. Difficult to place here [UK]." A stalemate ensued. Rivett replied to Madsen (7 August 1941) with a sense of desperation coupled with some humour. Since Madsen did not want Martyn¹¹ then "probably no one else will be anxious to have him either ... in these circumstances, if we have to be rid of Martyn from here, he may as well be put into Canada, since there is no need for a representative at Alaska or at the North Pole, and [I] have a feeling that we may go back on our decision just as we did on the former occasion." [No evidence was provided to explain the circumstances of the previous attempt to get rid of Martyn.] Then Rivett explained to Madsen that he was not anxious to let Martyn loose in Ottawa without some supervision. Thus, Rivett was forced to allow White to try yet another idea. The option of "just simply setting our friend at large in Australia would be taken seriously by the Service members of the RAB. On a former occasion, they said quite firmly that they would not permit this on any account. We seem ... to be caught in a cleft stick."

On 5 August 1941, White (who, after 10 March, had been thrown unawares into this organisational maelstrom) proposed a plan, based on a sense of desperation. It was now clear that most of the animosity with the PMG (with Witt especially) was due to the intransigence of Martyn. "Witt has evidently decided now that he can trust me to look after his interests [at the PMG] as well as RP interests in these co-operative questions. I do not feel that this will be easy with the present regime [Martyn as Chief]." White proposed that they keep Martyn at RP but demote him: "Give him the job of looking after 'development work' and take no part in the negotiations with PMG on production. If I [White] take over the direction of all outside contacts, we should probably be able to get on quite well with the outside concerns." White ended on an optimistic and naïve note: "One of my reasons for a change of view is that I know Martyn has, since I have been here, been trying to be as co-operative as possible."

¹¹ Rivett claimed to White that this suggestion from Madsen meant that he "was rather bankrupt of ideas".

Rivett (to White 7 August 1941) was resigned to let White try his hand, posing to him a major question: "can [Martyn] be definitely and irrevocably confined in his RP activities within the walls of RP? I expect ... this is the least upon which we can insist." If he "attempted to butt in on the field now ... reserved for you, there can be no more hesitation and we shall just have to cut the knot." Rivett's complete exhaustion with these conflicts was explained to Madsen in his 7 August 1941 letter: "I am afraid there is nothing else for it but to give this a trial, since you so clearly do not want to relieve us of our load by adding to your own. I don't blame you. But if there is any further difficulty with this young person [age 35], I for one will be forced to decline to have anything more to do with the general management unless he is removed." Then Rivett asked Madsen to destroy the letter!

During the next weeks, Rivett agonised how to resolve the dilemma; the Chair of CSIR, Julius, told Rivett that a "radical treatment" was the only solution to their present doubts about Martyn. Rivett told White on 11 August 1941: "... I do not see any alternatives to either accepting your amended proposal [to keep Martyn, but 'bind him in shackles'] or accept Madsen's [exile to Canada]. The only other possibility involves rather dire developments." A complication arose on 12 August when Martyn disappeared on a 10-day holiday. Rivett also tried to obtain advice from Sir Charles Burnett (Chief of Air Staff) on 18 August 1941::

There is an accumulation of evidence that Martyn is not fit to carry the responsibilities at present laid on him. On the other hand, there is increasing evidence that he does not know how to behave when he gets amongst the people who are engaged in the work on constructing RDF gear. He simple rubs them up the wrong way and altogether shows a lack of tact and common-sense which may have serious consequences if allowed to continue. On the other hand, White ... feels forced to the conclusion that the organisation of the RPL now requires a measure of capacity which Martyn just does not possess.

Burnett replied on 20 August 1940; the responsibility for security lay with the CSIR, not the military, "from the Security aspect I feel you must ensure that Martyn is under proper security. The suggestion to send him to Canada does not appeal to me ... Canada is a far cry from Australia." The RAAF would prefer to see Martyn exiled to the UK in order to absorb him in a "big organisation".

On 19 August 1941, White vacillated as he learned more about the background at RPL; at this time he had been at RPL for five months. In a letter to Rivett he expressed uncertainty:

I cannot say such an arrangement [White to take over all outside contacts] would be a satisfactory one. It is quite apparent that [RPL] is having an exceedingly difficult time in its contacts with all other institutions connected with his activities. The reason for these difficulties ... [is] due entirely to the Chief of the Division. It would be extremely difficult for me to attempt to smooth over the difficulties by restraining Martyn from outside contacts. During the last week, Martyn has been on vacation and I have been able to

learn a good deal more about the arrangements internally than has been possible previously. I ... [am] far from satisfied with the way in which the work [at RPL] has been conducted. I do not feel ... that I would be willing to go on acting as Chairman with Martyn running the laboratory work.

Two days later, White continued to express his uncertainty and doubts about the proposed position to continue collaborating with a “shackled” Martyn:

[White to Rivett] I do not think the management of the Laboratory has been altogether well conducted by Martyn ... I have had Witt [Director of the PMG Laboratories] here [this week] and with Martyn away, have been able to make arrangements with Witt which would have been impossible ... with Martyn present. I know now that all the outside contacts with this Lab have been very badly managed in the past, so much so that the work of the RAB has been seriously hampered. As far as Witt is concerned, it will be impossible for friendly relationships to continue if there is any danger of Martyn coming into the picture. You should know the position well enough now to be able to decide the future policy of [the CSIR] on this matter. I felt that, as a relative newcomer, I was somewhat uncertain whether I fully understood the situation enough to recommend a strong line to the Executive [of CSIR] ... [T]here seems no alternative now, if we are to get RP reinstated amongst the respectable institutions of CSIR.

By 3 September 1941, Rivett had just experienced a knock-down-drag-out session with Martyn, who had been summoned from Sydney to Melbourne. Rivett again sounded desperate: “I have lost all faith in further patching up processes.” Rivett had finally come to the conclusion that Martyn was never going to be acceptable to the external laboratories; Martyn was basically incompetent. Rivett had a very unpleasant conversation with Martyn, trying to convince him to “get a commission in the Army”. However, Rivett had not gone so far to tell him that “confidence had gone and we could no longer keep him in his present position”. White had convinced Rivett that the Martyn crisis not be discussed at the 29 August 1941 RAB. (This was to occur at the next meeting on 14 October 1941, see below.) For the first time, Rivett was frustrated by the vacillation shown by White, perhaps due to “measure of pity for Martyn coupled ... with an appreciation of the great difficulty of disposing of [Martyn] in a way that will not do damage to the [work of the RPL] ... I think he intends to put up an alternative proposal that Martyn be kept on but be restricted to one section of the laboratory work.”

A key letter from White to Rivett was written on the same day (3 September 1941) with a plan to organise the RPL; a major component was to be a demotion for Martyn¹². White (as Chair of the RAB) would take over the general administration of the laboratory, with three divisions: (1)

¹² White was certainly naïve in his prediction to Rivett that Martyn would object to this arrangement but would likely accept this “without any appreciable blow to his dignity. The whole rearrangement can be made on the basis of expediency.”

Low-frequency radar under the direction of Martyn (including 50 cm Naval radar, AW with range of 100-150 miles, ASV and IFF and receivers for the radar systems); (2) S band equipment at 10 cm, initially L.H. Martin and after he declined to move to Sydney, J.L. Pawsey; and (3) Liaison with PMG and Services – “for passing the prototype apparatus along for production”, David Myers.¹³

White raised the crucial question of a future title for Martyn. “The proposed arrangement actually means that [Martyn] would not be carrying out the duties as Chief of the Division. It might be possible for us to allow him to consider to hold this title ... This is the chief weakness of the proposal.” Rivett agreed, in his handwriting the note “Title must go” is found.

For the second time in a month, on 3 September, White repeated to Rivett a complaint earlier made by Rivett to Madsen (see above, 7 August): “I feel that this present recurrence of difficulty is very largely due to a failure to clear up the matter when it last occurred. Martyn has ... tried to adhere to the understanding he gave to the Executive at that time.” Unfortunately, the details of this previous episode are missing from the archive. Apparently, White suggested to Rivett that an earlier reprimand to Martyn was not followed-up.

As usual with conflicts with Martyn, the story was far from over. By this point, Rivett was so exasperated that he resorted to mild humour in response to the flood of letters and phone calls from White (4 September 1941):

[Rivett to White] I confess that at the moment I am puzzled almost to the point of laughter, if you understand what that point is. Julius [Sir George, the Chairman of CSIR] has sent me a letter in which he tells me that he is committing you definitely to the opinions that he has expressed in it. (a) That the man [Martyn] concerned must be removed from his present position, (b) that he cannot be left in the lab in any position, and (c) that we must do all we can to help him move to another field. On top of this I have your proposal to divide the lab into three sections, and to put DF in charge of the one which I imagine is the biggest of them all. Do you wonder if I laugh, or at least smile; at any rate I can sympathise with you over the two half days of discussion which preceded the letter writing ... It is probably hopeless to get DF [Martyn] to see his own shortcomings, but I shall make one more hard effort in replying tomorrow to his letter ... The title of Chief should not be retained. I blame myself for ever having suggested that it be given to [Martyn in 1939].

... I had a letter from Martyn [3 September] which is far from satisfactory ... He gives a lengthy statement about the shortcomings of the PMG leading up to the construction of

¹³ An updated organization plan was published by White on 27 September 1941 with an additional group, Production of Lab Prototype, including workshop, drawing office and the design group. Likely, the head was to have been H.J. Brown (unnamed on the document). David Myers was also listed as the head of group (3) in a proposed re-organisation plan of 9 September from Rivett and White; later the name was crossed out with a pencil, indicating that Myers had declined.

a model which he describes again as shoddy and flimsy and likely to be a complete failure. He then goes on: 'You can well imagine my feelings when you lay the blame squarely on my shoulders.' After all my labour to convince him that his failure was due to incapacity to get on with other people and to organise work, it is a little bit amusing to be told that I was charging him with responsibility for a shoddy and flimsy production of which ... I knew nothing at all. It is probably perfectly hopeless to get DF [Martyn] to see his own shortcomings, but I shall make one more hard effort in replying tomorrow to his letter.

The letter from Martyn was a rambling, defensive response, full of excuses as he passed the blame to others. Martyn began the letter with a threat of resignation after he was told by White that Martyn's attempts to re-organise the lab (external liaison in the hands of White) were to be rejected.

In the circumstances, I felt that finality had been reached and I had better make arrangements to leave ... I am afraid I felt your attitude in Melbourne was so severely critical and uncompromising that it would be useless to see you again. I do feel that it is practically useless to go on working under an Executive which regards me in the light you apparently do. I feel that you have formed the impression in our few and brief contacts with me that you are dealing with a difficult and aggressive individual, but how can any man be otherwise when severely criticised, as he honestly believes, unjustly.

Martyn went on at length a (page and half) to pass the blame to the poor mechanical engineering skills of the PMG, including the "shoddy and flimsy" accusation. At the end of his letter, Martyn praised White:

It is a matter of great regret that this should be brought up just as White and I were settling down to working rather harmoniously together. Personally I like White very much indeed, and I believe there is an understanding between us which can perhaps only exist between people of the same generation [Rivett was 21 years older than Martyn who was a year younger than White].

The even-tempered Rivett replied calmly to Martyn (9 September). He stated again his lack of knowledge beforehand of the "shoddy and flimsy work".

It has been made obvious to the Executive that there were clashes of temperament which threatened disaster. There was also reason for grave doubt about your own ability to organise thoroughly the growing work on the Laboratory. This had given rise to the question of whether we had not perhaps been unreasonable in expecting that your capacity as a research man would be equalled by your ability as an organiser.

In the next days there, White and Rivett discussed the next step. The idea was to use the organisation plan of 3 September proposed by White; this was to be presented to the Minister for the CSIR. On 12 September, Rivett wrote to White with a list of three changes¹⁴:

- (1) The Chairman of the RAB was to take over all administrative duties at RPL.
- (2) The position of Chief was to be abolished, “which was rather unnecessary at any time in view of the existence of a Chairman of the Board who [was] really the proper intermediary between RP and the Executive Committee”.
- (3) LH Martin (of the University of Melbourne) was to be offered a position as a research professor.

The Chairman of the RAB and the three (or four) group leaders would administer the RPL. By 26 September 1941, a memo had been sent to the Minister for the CSIR and to Martyn. Although Martyn had threatened to resign if his title disappeared, he did accept this demotion. On 26 September 1941, White wrote Rivett: “He is reconciled to the abolition of the position as Chief, and as long as we spare him any ‘public demotion’, is in agreement with all my suggestions.” Nothing was ever simple with David Martyn. He insisted that his salary be maintained at the previous level. Since a number of people within CSIR would be aware of the amount of his salary, a reduction would be “a definite indication of degradation”. On 29 September 1941, Martyn stressed this point in a letter to Rivett:

I greatly regret that I am quite unable to accept this proposal [salary reduction] ... A reduction in salary ... necessarily implies misconduct or serious inefficiency ... I cannot possibly accept [this] under the present conditions. I would be willing ... to face a properly conducted enquiry into my past administration and general direction of the RP Division as its Chief ... [F]ailing this [and he did accept all other rearrangements], I could not accept the implications which necessarily would follow my acceptance of this proposal.

Resolution of this conflict would continue until 6 November 1941.

Rivett was again provoked by Martyn, expressed in his letter to White on 30 September: “There is not a shadow of doubt about the fact. Not only is the Executive dissatisfied [with Martyn], but I have told him quite bluntly.” The self-serving letter of 29 September was the last straw for

¹⁴ The complexity of the situation and the pressures being applied to Rivett were exemplified in a letter that Rivett wrote to Madsen (in the UK, see NRAO ONLINE 13, in a letter from Rivett to Madsen 8 September 1941 on another topic). As an afterthought, Rivett wrote: “As to the position here [of David Martyn], I am afraid I cannot give you a very healthy statement at the moment. The decision to end our association with D.F.[Martyn] is likely to be modified. Actually we are dreadfully up against it for senior staff. You drained the upper ranks [transferred staff to the US and the UK] and the subsequent departures of Pawsey [to the US] and Pulley [to New Zealand] left White in almost a grave plight in view of the DFM [Martyn] situation.”

Rivett (letter to White on 1 October): "I am afraid that [this letter] ... rather dampens any desire one has had to save him from the realities of the position ... Martyn would seem almost to be regarding himself as an unfortunate, ill-treated and misunderstood individual, deserving sympathy rather than the direct disapproval which the Executive has expressed about his activities." On 2 October 1941, Rivett wrote Martyn for the last time, further correspondence was useless and future correspondence would be via official letters from G. Lightfoot, the Secretary of the CSIR Executive. Rivett explained that he had been blunt in his conversations with Martyn, as had Sir George Julius (Chair of CSIR). "... [O]ne might be pardoned for supposing that you never heard of our discontent at all. The suggestion ... that the difficult relationships with the PMG are assigned to an eagerness of your part to improve quantity, quality and rate of output [of radar equipment] show that you have failed to appreciate the issue or else have decided to refuse to do so."

The official letter from Lightfoot was sent to Martyn on 3 October 1941. The position of Chief at RPL was abolished.¹⁵ True to form, Martyn filed a formal appeal to the CSIR on 8 October. He was again especially upset by the salary reduction; according to Martyn this was an effective "disrating". Thus, he demanded a "proper enquiry, at which [he would have] the opportunity to defend himself" against the charges of misconduct or serious inefficiency. And yet again he made his threat: "... [W]ithout this I would be unable to continue to work in the RPL, lacking the confidence of the Executive Committee, and with the stigma of disrating me."

Almost a week later (14 October 1941) the 15th RAB meeting was held in Melbourne at the Naval Board. Rivett finally presented the new arrangements of the RPL to the RAB¹⁶. A discussion of the fate of Martyn was on the agenda. A major topic was an attempt to answer the question, what was to be the fate of the former Chief of Radiophysics, a clear security risk? Since 17 April 1941, the RAB had been informed about the Ella Horne scandal. Again, there was a closed discussion. The minutes reported: "Re-organisation in the RP Laboratory. Sir David Rivett outlined the steps CSIR was taking to re-organise this Laboratory." The details were only published in the restricted minutes:

Sir David Rivett outlined the way CSIR had recently reorganised the RPL. It had been decided to abolish the position of Chief of the Laboratory and to organise its work into three sections--one dealing with long-wave work, one dealing with short-wave work and the other concerned with liaison on the production side. Mr Martyn had been offered the opportunity of taking charge of the first of these sections at a salary of £ 1000 per year instead of his former salary of £1350 as Chief. This decision had been officially

¹⁵ The laboratory would not have a chief until 10 October 1942, when White assumed this role – see below. In the year after 3 October 1941, White effectively ran the RPL as the Chairman and then Deputy Chairman (after December 1941, when Madsen returned from overseas just after Pearl Harbour) of the RAB.

¹⁶ A discussion at the previous meeting would have been premature since many of the details had only been sorted out in the course of September and early October 1941.

conveyed to Dr Martyn who had replied [on 8 October]. This reply was read. It contained firstly a request that an official enquiry be held into the whole matter and secondly an indication that, rather than accept a reduction in emolument with its implied censure, Dr Martyn would probably prefer to leave the service of CSIR.

In the subsequent discussion, it was agreed that an enquiry was out of the question. Both Sir Charles Burnett [RAAF] and General Sturdee [Army] indicated that there was no place for Dr Martyn in their respective Services apart from radiolocation [research in Australia], and that his use as a Service officer in the field [frontlines in New Guinea] was obviously out of the question in the circumstances that applied. They both felt that he should not be allowed to leave CSIR [so that he could be under continual surveillance].

It was finally suggested that the CSIR might explore the possibility of paying Dr Martyn an allowance of £ 100 in addition to his proposed salary of £ 1000. Sir David Rivett undertook to look into this suggestion.

On 16 October 1941, Lightfoot replied to the 8 October demand of Martyn's for an official enquiry. The CSIR pointed out that there was no provision in the Public Service Act for an enquiry like the one proposed by Martyn. His request was denied. A last avenue was open for Martyn; on 21 October 1941, he wrote J.J. Dedman, the Minister for the CSIR. He provided a history of the events of the founding of the RPL and the running of the Laboratory for the previous two years; his description of the experience since 1939 minimised the conflicts of 1941. The main complaint was again the salary issue: "The salary angle per se is relatively unimportant, but what is very important is the implied disrating, and the reasons which have been put forward ... for taking this step." He wanted an enquiry which had a judicial structure.

I know of no way by which [CSIR] can be informed fully of the facts ... unless by an enquiry at which I am confronted by the evidence, and given an opportunity of defending myself [with representation]. That appears to be a fundamental principle of justice, and one of the very principles for which we are fighting this war ... [I]f I were to take up other war work the present stigma might follow me and make it difficult to have my services used to the present advantage.

On 24 October 1941, Dedman was briefed on the reality of the case by the CSIR ("Martyn is not capable of organising and directing the work of the Laboratory ... The plain fact is that Dr Martyn, as a leader, has lost the confidence of the people ultimately responsible for the conduct of his work.") On 31 October 1941, Dedman sent a letter to Martyn. Based on the CSIR response and Martyn's exaggerated claims, the request for an enquiry was denied. If he had been charged with any misdemeanour or disobeyed orders he would have been granted a hearing. The CSIR Executive and the RAB were in a position to judge his managerial abilities. To Martyn's credit, he wrote Lightfoot on 6 November that he accepted the ruling and would accept the position offered on 3 October.

Rivett and White were also in contact with Madsen about the major changes underway at RPL. The edifice erected by Madsen in 1939 was crumbling. Rivett wrote on 8 September 1941 to Madsen in the UK.¹⁷

As to the position here [at CSIR], I am afraid I cannot give you a very healthy statement at the moment. The decision to end our association with [Martyn] is likely to be modified. Actually, we are dreadfully up against it with our senior staff. [The loss of staff to overseas liaison and Pawsey to the US and Canada in mid-1941] left White in almost a grave plight in view of the DFM [Martyn] situation. The whole situation will be discussed very thoroughly this week and I may be able to enclose with this a copy of a proposal I am putting up to the Executive. [This copy has not been located.]

An update was provided to Madsen on 24 September 1941:

... I think I can report some finality of the redistribution of duties in RP. Firstly, as a result of recent discussions with McVey and Witt I think I have at last got our relationships with the PMG on a sound footing. There is no doubt that things were being held up through mistrust on their part. However, that seems clear at the moment.

... Next, I am personally to take over the general administration of the RPL, while Martyn has agreed to become Director of Research inside the lab. That will mean that he will be able to confine his attention entirely to the internal research, which wants close attention and some considerable pushing ...

During October 1941, major changes were also taking place in the Australian government. On 28 August 1941, Menzies was replaced as leader of the United Australia Party and the Country Party leader Arthur McFadden became Prime Minister for several weeks. He was unable to retain support in the House of Representatives. On 7 October 1941, John Curtin (Leader of the Australian Labor Party) became the new Prime Minister (remaining in office until his death 5 July 1945). The previous government team, responsible for Australian government policy and the CSIR (Casey, Holt, Menzies, Page et al) was replaced by a new team (Curtin, Dedeman, Evatt, Beasley et al).

Schedvin (1987, page 258) provided a succinct summary of Martyn's career after 1941:

Martyn was one of Australia's greatest scientists and continued his distinguished career in upper atmosphere research for many years after the war until his death by suicide in 1970. At the time of his death he was president of the Australian Academy of Science. The tragedy of these war years was that he was unable to bring to fruition independent production of radar in Australia. He was the victim of the need to introduce high technology at great speed on an inadequate foundation of skill and experience, and of his personal indiscretions and irrational need for self-promotion. He would have made a

¹⁷ Document No.35, Supplementary Documents to Evans (1970), *History of the RAB, 1939-1945*.

much more substantial contribution if he had been able to concentrate on research without the responsibilities of chief.

The unmaking of one man is often the making of another. White was only one year older than Martyn, and if anything less experienced. He had an intense dislike of the animosity surrounding Martyn's fall from grace, and on many subsequent occasions in a long career with CSIRO he would go to great lengths to avoid open conflict. But he was able to keep his head while all around were losing theirs. He had the capacity to simplify, perhaps oversimplify, complex situations, and to keep his ultimate objective firmly in mind. The organisational changes of 1941 did not go nearly far enough, but White could hardly be blamed for that. What he did do was to exert a steadying influence at a critical time, and in so doing gained a reputation for managerial capacity and imperturbability. (Additional Note 2 provides a list of some key dates in Martyn's life; Additional Note 3 is a summary of the tragic mental collapse suffered by Martyn while in Europe during 1954.)

The tragedy of 1941 is that substantial effort had been expended by both the CSIR management and the RPL to repair and re-build the administrative structure put together by Rivett and Madsen two years earlier. The 1939 efforts to promote the appointment of the 33-year old David Martyn as the first Chief of Radiophysics had led to a imbroglio in 1941; unfortunately, David Martyn was an incompetent manager, both within RPL and in the exercise of external relations.¹⁸ The rapid development of air warning that should have occurred in Australia in 1941 was impeded by the choice of a false defence strategy (a blunder made by the Australian Military) and then by the slowness of the development of the Shore Defence radar. In addition, the Australian perception of the air threat was slow to develop. Clearly, the delays in radar planning during the course of 1941 had serious consequences, both internally to CSIR and more importantly, the efforts that the replacement of Martyn cost the CSIR management. What would have happened in the course of 1941 at RPL if the CSIR management had not been forced to replace Martyn is, of course, a matter of speculation. What would have been the impact on a successful, rapid development of air warning, before war with Japan in December 1941? The senior management was forced to spend an inordinate amount of time dealing with Martyn during August to October 1941, only four months before the Darwin attack. Even the Australian Military played a role in evaluating the fate of Martyn. As we read between the lines, it has become clear to us that the Australian military leaders became more and more frustrated that the civilian scientists (the "boffins") in Australia could not deal with an underperforming leader, Martyn. From our perspective from 75 years later, we can only imagine what the Australian military leadership would have done if a major military leader had been implicated in a security scandal. The military would certainly have reacted sternly and quickly if one their own had begun a sexual relationship with a German woman, a possible Sydney "mata hari". An additional misjudgement was the fact that Madsen left the scene in April 1941, while the chaos caused by Martyn's behaviour was still unravelling. When White arrived "cold" from New

¹⁸ Rivett may also share in the responsibility for these management problems in 1940-1941 since he had encouraged the appointment of the un-tested Martyn in 1939.

Zealand on 10 March 1941, he was expected to solve the chronic problem of RPL management. He was required to spend time on problems left behind by Madsen, continuing to the resolution of the Martyn case in early November 1941. War with Japan was only a month in the future and the attacks on Darwin would begin in mid-February 1941.

The impact of these events were to last for the next 29 years, until Martyn's death by suicide in 1970. Cockburn and Ellyard have discussed this in detail in their book of 1981 *The Life and Times of Sir Mark Oliphant*, chapter 15 "Groves of Acadème".

The humiliation [Martyn] suffered [in 1941] affected both personal and institutional relationships for many years ... [For example], in 1955 (21 April), Martyn wrote Oliphant during a period of pronounced conflict over the functioning of the newly formed Australian Academy of Science¹⁹: "I can believe that Rivett may have said some nice things about me some time. But a real supporter is someone who does something to help. His only positive actions towards me in 24 years [i.e. since 1941] was to demote me, and cut my salary by one third."

SUMMARY

During 1941, Martyn was side-lined, after major efforts by the CSIR administration. Fred White came from New Zealand and brought a semblance of internal order to the RP lab. He needed the help of a strong team: Pawsey, Minnett, Munro, Piddington, H. J. Brown, Martin, Oliphant (in 1942), Israel (RAAAF), Bullock and Worledge (NSWGR) (and many others). By the end of 1942, the major success story of the RP lab in WWII had been perfected, the LW/AW. This success was based on an inspired un-official collaboration of the RAAF (Bert Israel), RPL (Joe Pawsey) and the New South Wales Government (J.G. Q. Worledge and Ernie Bullock) as the remarkable LW/AW (light weight air warning) radar was invented and manufactured. Details of this story are presented in Chapter 9 and ESM_9.4 and ESM_9.5).

In September 1941, The Australians did not realise that their country was under major threat from Japan, only 5 to 8 months in the future. Their government, their military and their British masters had convinced them that the enemy would strike the country and continent from the sea (ships) not the air (aircraft carriers). The use of the newly perfected weapon, the aircraft carrier, had been fully appreciated by the Japanese military to the detriment of the US and

¹⁹ Later in the year (late November), the conflict had escalated to the point where Oliphant (president), Hedley Marston (treasurer) and Martyn (secretary, physical science) all resigned from the Academy. Only Martyn refused to withdraw his resignation. Oliphant viewed Martyn as the main trouble maker. The challenge for Oliphant was to mediate between three strong personalities: Martyn, Rivett and Marston. The dislike of Rivett and especially Marston for Martyn complicated Oliphant's role as peacemaker. Ironically, Martyn was to become President of the Australian Academy of Science in 1969 (until his death in March 1970), succeeding Macfarlane Burnett as the fifth President of the Australian Academy of Science.

Australians. The failure of these two allies to comprehend the new strategic model was a costly blunder, experienced after the same Japanese ships struck Hawaii on the morning of 7 December 1941 and a month later at Darwin on 19 February 1942. Radar was **almost** available in both instances. Fortunately, both the Americans and the Australians recovered their missing shield during the course of 1942-43. By June 1942, the Battle of Midway, five of the six aircraft carriers in the Japanese fleet that had attacked Hawaii were sunk. All four of the aircraft carriers at Darwin were also at the bottom of the Pacific: *Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu*.

Martyn's problems continued in 1944 when he may have been the first target of the Commonwealth Intelligence Service (successor of the CIB, before ASIO was formed in 1949). William Simpson, Director General of CIS ordered the interception of David Martyn's telephone and that of his fiancée, Margot Adams. They also ordered the interception of their close friend Shanyi Maier, the Chinese wife of a German internee and an alleged femme fatale. The details were reported in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 25 September 2012. The article reported the marriage plans of Martyn and Adams as well as intimate conversations of Maier. "But she was no spy. Six decades later the files were transferred to the National Archives of Australia ... Nothing of security significance was discovered. Brigadier Simpson thought the exercise had been "first class from a technical viewpoint".

Additional Note 1. White 1983

On 13 March 1983, 42 years after 1941 and 11 years before his death, Sir Fred White wrote a letter to E.G. Bowen in Sydney. Apparently, White was thinking back over his remarkable career in CSIR and CSIRO (1941 to 1970) with special emphasis on his legacy. White wrote a three-page text: "The Origins of Radioastronomy in CSIRO- Recollections of an Executive" that accompanied the letter. The introduction to the origins document:

In 1941, I was induced by the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand to leave my post as Professor at Canterbury University College in New Zealand to come to Australia to join in the wartime radar activity there. Madsen, Electrical Engineering at Sydney, wished me to act for him as Chairman of the Radiophysics Advisory Board while he went overseas to establish important wartime arrangements in London and Washington.

I arrived in March 1941; Madsen left for overseas in April and left me to struggle for seven months in, to me, an alien environment with the staff at the Division of Radiophysics, the three Fighting Services, with the Government Departments (such as the Post Office) and with CSIR.

The baptism of tough administration of research and development, of which I had no previous experience probably prepared me to accept with enthusiasm the invitation to join the Executive Committee of the CSIR in Melbourne [January 1945]. I certainly found

this more attractive than returning after four years absence to my chair in Christchurch and beginning once again to reconstruct a teaching and research program.

The letter contained some additional concerns. After David Martyn's suicide of 1970 at the CSIRO Upper Atmosphere Section, 5 March 1970, in Camden NSW, likely questions concerning the nature of his dismissal as RPL Chief in 1941 had been raised by colleagues. White wrote a frank response to Bowen, who had had a troubled and controversial relationship with Martyn since 1945.

[White to Bowen, 13 March 1983] The question how I came to replace DFM [Martyn] is constantly being raised- I must make that as public as I can. There is no mystery- it was just that he was really a pain in the neck to me, Rivett, Julius (Chairman of CSIR) and the PO (Post Office, who were making radar equipment for the Services)- under the war stress he had to be relegated to internal RP duties. He was I think misplaced during the war – out of his element but very generously treated post war. [Often in the intervening years, White had been forced to intercede between Bowen and Martyn.]

An additional revelation occurred to White in 1983. Boris Schedvin was working on his history of CSIR, a monumental achievement that was to be published in 1987: *Shaping Science and Industry: A History of Australia's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 1926-49*. From the National Archives of Australia he obtained the Ella Horne Security File (see above) on 23 May 1983. He clearly was struck by the serious accusations levelled against Martyn and passed this information on to White. The surprising and decisive information from the Australian Academy of Science document received in August 2017 (see footnote 2 above) consisted of three handwritten notes in the margins written by White in 1983 (White has written in pencil on page one "Written 1983, FWGW seen by Boris Schedvin") according to his note on page 1 (of 4) of his document "Dr DF Martyn and the Radiophysics Advisory Board". There are two copies of the document with two different hand-written notes written by White, both adjacent to the text on page 2 in his original document which reads:

It is evident too that Martyn had been an object of concern to the Intelligence Services (we all were). Although no report is available [last two words underlined in pencil by White] Rivett evidently knew of this. Martyn, in May 1941, asked Rivett about this. "What is the accusation?" His letter mentions a lady of his acquaintance, of German origin but a British subject who was interested in renting his flat. He gave an assurance of his loyalty and asked that Intelligence be asked to state their case. Rivett said it was inadvisable to do this. (May 1941).

White's two notes on the two copies appear on the right side of page 2 in the middle near the "it was inadvisable". One note appears on copy 1 of the document and note 2 appears in the same place on copy 2. The notes are close to the "inadvisable to do this" text.

(1) NOTE 1 on COPY 1: Boris Schedvin tells me that information found in the Nat. Archives shows suspicion of Martyn to be much more serious than I imagined! [in 1941]

(2) NOTE 2 on COPY 2: This is confirmed by the release of confidential papers after 30 years [in fact 42]. I believed [in 1941?] there was no foundation [of the rumours of the liaison with Ella Horne.]

The surprising result is that White had not been informed in 1941 by the Intelligence services of Martyn's poor judgement in his choice of a companion. As we view these events of 81 years ago, a major uncertainty remains: Were Rivett and Madsen informed of Martyn's indiscretions?

Additional Note 2. D.F. Martyn timeline²⁰

On 1 June 1942, Martyn was seconded to the Operations Research Group – Australian Army (this had been proposed in a letter from 5 May 1942). In this position, he worked on a number of projects including the publication of an instructional manual for weather forecasting in the war zone: RP 220, from 4 September 1944 by David Martyn and Pat Squires "Preliminary Instruction Manual of Weather Forecasting for Radar Operations in the South West Pacific Area". This research was a collaboration between the Directorate of Meteorological Services of the RAAF and the Atmospheric Physics Group at RPL. A major goal was to characterise the effect of the lower atmosphere (troposphere) on the newly available S band (10 cm), X band (3 cm) and K band (1.3 cm). Thus, Martyn was working at RP when White became the RP Chief on 10 October 1943. Martyn then transferred back to RP on 27 April 1944. Within four months (14 September 1944), Rivett wrote Madsen. "It seems to me that a satisfactory solution of the DFM problem is in sight." The proposal was to send Martyn to the Commonwealth Observatory (Director Richard Woolley) as a member of the Radio Research Board. Encouraged by Woolley, Martyn was to continue research on theoretical studies of the motions of the F2 ionospheric layer, a project begun by CSO staff member and future friend of radio astronomers in Australia, C.W. Allen ("Cla"). On 18 September 1944, Martyn agreed; he moved to Canberra and the CSO on 1 December 1944. In 1950, he was elected to Fellowship in the Royal Society of London and in 1953 became a Foundation Fellow of the Australian Academy of Science. In 1956, Martyn moved to the Radio Research Board station in Camden. This became the CSIRO Upper Atmosphere Section in 1958, Martyn as Officer in Charge. On 5 March 1970 at the CSIRO Station, he committed suicide with a 22 rifle shot to the brain. He was President of the

²⁰ Compelling biographical memoirs of Martyn were written by Piddington and Oliphant (Piddington, J. H., & Oliphant, M. L. (1971). David Forbes Martyn. *Historical Records of Australian Science*, 2(2), 47-60.) and HSW Massey (Massey, H.S.W. (1971). "David Forbes Martyn. 1906-1970." *Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society*: 497-510) and R.W. Home (Home, R.W. (2000). "Martyn, David Forbes (1906–1970)", *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University p 320). (Home's text contains a frank discussion of the Ella Horne scandal.)

Australian Academy of Science at his death (succeeding Sir Macfarlane Burnet in 1969). He had been offered the presidency of the International Council of Scientific Unions in 1968, but declined stating that he considered that the President of ICSU should reside closer to the centre of gravity of international science activities (Piddington and Oliphant, 1971). Home (2000) has written concerning Martyn's tragic death: "Late in life, Martyn became deeply concerned about the degradation of the environment, and his fear of impending disaster contributed to the depressed state of mind that led him to commit suicide on 5 March 1970 at his Camden home [the CSIRO Upper Atmosphere Section]."

Martyn was quoted in an ABC programme two days later on 7 March 1970, organised by Peter Pockley and Michael Daley of the ABC ("The World Tomorrow", ABC Radio 2nd network, 8:15 AM). Three quotes from Martyn, recorded previously in 1969, were included. Martyn (8 November 1969) hoped the youth of Australia would adopt pollution as a cause instead of opposition to the US and (Australian) war in Vietnam:

I see plenty of energy in the young people, and I see it as largely misdirected. In fact, I think they would very like to have a cause where they really had a good grievance and I think they've got a good grievance about pollution. And I'd like to see them instead of marching about Vietnam and the establishment and vague things such as they do march about- I'd rather see them concentrate on a definite thing like pollution where any result they achieved would be worthwhile.

Additional Note 3: Martyn's collapse in 1954 – Mental Illness, 1954-1956.

In the biographical memoir of Jack Piddington by Don Melrose and Harry Minnett (*Historical Records of Australian Science*, vol 12, no2, p. 229, 1998), the mental illness of David Martyn was discussed:

The closeness between Piddington and Martyn is indicated by an incident that Bob Duncan [at the Camden, Upper Atmosphere Section from 1953 to 1970] recalls from the early days at Camden; Piddington persuaded Martyn to have shock treatment for his mental illness [in 1956, see below], and Piddington and Duncan signed the required form for this to occur.

The severity of Martyn's tragic illness became obvious in 1954 during a chaotic trip to Europe, beginning with the URSI Congress in late August 1954. Martyn and a number of Australian colleagues were in The Hague (Netherlands); Martyn was a member of the URSI Executive in 1954 and at the URSI conference was elected to be the next President of the Ionosphere Commission.²¹

²¹ NAA, A8520, PH/MAR/12 Part 6. Personnel file David F. Martyn

The first notice of trouble was reported to the CSIRO on 27 August 1954 in a cable to Clunies Ross from McCarthy of the High Commission of Australia staff in London. Martyn had found it necessary to leave URSI on 24 August and return to London. "He is suffering from mental aberration. Since his return he has been in discussion with [Walter Ives, Chief Scientific Liaison Officer] and also with medical relatives. As from today, he is in the care of his brother [also a physician, Dr Allan Martyn] in Edinburgh." The Chief Medical Officer of the High Commission [Dr J. Bryan Mathieson] had reported that David Martyn was unfit to travel home. Martyn had already cancelled his attendance at the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, to be held during the next weeks in Rome. Pawsey had also decided not to attend the Rome meeting (Chapter 24).

A number of confused reports reached the Australians in the next days. A coherent account was finally available when Ives wrote the Chairman of CSIRO Sir Ian Clunies Ross on 2 September. He had first seen Martyn on the day after he had left The Hague:

He had for some days felt that he was being checked up on by the Intelligence group of one of the Western Countries [Martyn had mentioned MI-5 and the "US Security Service" - presumably the CIA]. He had developed a firm impression that in each hotel at which he had stayed, people had immediately taken the room next to him and placed microphones in such a way that they could hear everything he said. He had come to the conclusion that he was under surveillance and indeed that his life might be in jeopardy. [Also, in The Hague he had been served a cognac in his hotel; Martyn was convinced that it was poisoned. He brought a sample back to the UK. The Australian High Commission staff had a professional chemist carry out a test who found no trace of poison.]

After a time in The Hague he had found it impossible to stand the strain any longer and had mentioned his feelings to Sir Edward Appleton, who had advised him to return to London. Martyn had done this and had felt that even on the trip [from the Netherlands] by plane he had been shadowed. His suspicions had been confirmed during the first night at the Tavistock Hotel [in London] when once again he felt that there was a microphone placed so that people in the next room could check his conversation.²²

On the following morning, 26 August 1954, Martyn rang Ives and had him come to the hotel. Finding him sitting on his suitcase in the corridor of the hotel, he was distraught. During the previous night, the people in the next room were reported by Martyn as having said in a loud voice: "Shall we kill him now?" Martyn then reported he had phoned [presumably in the early morning], his cousin, Dr R Vaughn Jones, a doctor at St Thomas's Hospital in London. Vaughn

²² Later McCarthy of the High Commission staff talked to a contact in British intelligence in London. "This officer thought it extremely unlikely that there would have been any security check ... on Dr Martyn while [in the Netherlands] or ... the UK. He certainly did not know of anything which has been done by his own unit." (Ives to Clunies Ross, 15 October 1954)

Jones took him to Scotland Yard, telling a sceptical agent about his fears and experiences of the past two weeks in The Hague and London, as well as presenting several pages of notes describing his story. Vaughn Jones was initially so convinced of the reality of the story that he later told Dr Mathieson that it “was some time before he was convinced that [the story] was a figment of [Martyn’s] imagination”.²³

The disasters continued. Ives then took Martyn to Australia House where they met the Official Secretary of the High Commission. It was suggested to Martyn that he take some time off and to visit relatives in Leeds or his brother in Scotland. In the afternoon, Ives returned to the Tavistock Hotel and tried to assure Martyn that British Intelligence was not following him. Martyn then decided that the investigation was led by an agency of another country and that he had to move to a new hotel. Ives took him to the Westway Hotel on Euston Road at the end of the afternoon, 26 August. Ives returned to his office on the Strand. A few minutes later Martyn rang; he had found the hotel manager in his room discussing the “installation of microphones through the floorboards”. After a hurried phone call to his cousin, Dr Vaughn Jones, he decided to go his uncle’s house that evening in Leeds (both the uncle and his wife were also medical doctors). Unaccompanied by Ives, Martyn took the 6:10 pm train from King’s Cross, after deliberately misleading the taxi driver to take him first to Euston station. (Martyn was worried about being followed; he wrote Ives on 29 August that “he could not tell if he was followed” from the Westway Hotel to the two stations.) After Martyn was judged by the family in Leeds to be “overwrought”, they decided that David’s brother, Dr Allan Martyn²⁴ (another medico!) from Airdrie Scotland, would come to collect David on 27 August to recuperate for some weeks. David Martyn called the High Commission the following Tuesday to provide an update on his improved condition.

Ives ended his report (2 September 1954) to Clunies Ross on a sombre note: “I hope this gives you some picture of what has happened. Martyn is still convinced he was shadowed. But, of course if he abandons this view he must believe he was temporarily a little unbalanced- most of us would find that a disagreeable alternative. He should be all right once he gets home.”

However, by 5 September 1954 Martyn was well enough to travel to Cambridge and the Cavendish Laboratory for a series of lectures²⁵ during the next week. Pawsey reported to Ives

²³ Letter from Dr Mathieson to the Martyn file on 30 August 1954. Also: “Dr Martyn has some insight into his condition as will be instanced from the following remark [of Martyn reported by Vaughn Jones]- ‘Either I am being followed or I am looney’.”

²⁴ We have discovered a coincidental connection with Dr Allan Martyn and the radio astronomy community. Later in his career, he moved to a medical practice close to Jodrell Bank Observatory. Prof Rodney D. Davies (FRS, 1930-2015, past Director at Jodrell Bank, colleague of Pawsey at CSIRO in the early 1950s) of the University of Manchester told Goss in 2006 that Allan Martyn was his family physician for many years.

²⁵ He stayed until 10 or 11 September 1954, spending a weekend with his sister at Derby, then going to London on 13 September until the departure on 15 September 1954 on BOAC Flight 704 for Singapore. He arrived in Sydney on 19 September 1954, after a few days layover in Singapore. He was met at Mascot in Sydney by Arthur Higgs, the Divisional Secretary of RPL. Walter Ives had insured that Prof R S

that Martyn was the star of the conference.²⁶ "Pawsey says that Martyn's was the outstanding contribution at last week's [Physics of the Ionosphere, organised by Ratcliffe and colleagues at Corpus Christi College, 6- 9 September 1954] conference at the Cavendish." Earlier Ives had written on 9 September a memo for the Martyn file, after he had travelled to Cambridge on 8 September to evaluate Martyn (the first time they had met in person since the "hotel" disasters of 26 August).

Dr Martyn seemed much more composed than he had been when I had last seen him about a fortnight previously. Dr Pawsey, who had been with him at The Hague, and was now also at Corpus Christi [with Martyn], agreed that DF appeared to be under less strain. At the same time, Martyn was still chain-smoking and I formed the opinion that he would still be wise to take a long holiday as soon as he got back to Australia.

During the period at Cambridge, Ives met Prof A.H. Waynick from Penn State University, who had been the leader of the US delegation at URSI. Martyn had claimed that Wayrick could confirm his suspicion that constant surveillance of scientists had occurred on a broad scale.²⁷ Ives quoted a conversation he had with the American: "Prof Waynack told me that one member of his delegation who might have been conceivably carrying classified documents, had had his suitcase checked while absent from his hotel room. Professor Waynick could express no opinion about whether any check would have been made on Dr Martyn." Waynick was quite reluctant to discuss the matter; apparently, he did not think it a serious issue. An additional incident had also occurred, involving the US ionospheric physicist Lloyd Berkner, well known to CSIR RRB scientists based on an extensive visit to Australia in the late 1930s. Ives did not meet Berkner, a friend of Martyn's. Martyn reported that Berkner (a former Naval officer) had reported that Berkner had been subject to intermittent checking by security personnel. Martyn was quoted by Ives: "As I recall, Martyn's report of his discussion with Berkner was 'Well, Martyn, you will just have to get used to this sort of thing. I have had it for fifteen years and regard it as part of my life.' Whether Berkner said this, I do not know but at least Martyn claimed nothing more to have come out of their conversation."

In the end, Berkner nor Waynick had any direct experience of surveillance as claimed by Martyn.

The lecture schedule was impressive. In a hand written letter from Martyn to Clunies Ross on 9 September from Cambridge, Martyn tried to paint a rosy picture of his decision to return early to Australia. No details of his distress and confusion were provided.

The great part of my job here is done- I gave eight Scott Lectures at the Cavendish, three to all and 5 to Ratcliffe's group; represented Australia at URSI

Edwards from CSIRO was a co-passenger with Martyn during the long trip. The ASLO was apprehensive as Martyn travelled the long distance back to Australia, including the layover in Singapore.

²⁶ Handwritten letter of 14 September 1954 from Ives to Clunies Ross.

²⁷ 15 October 1954. Ives to Clunies Ross.

Executive, represented URSI on the Mixed Commission at Brussels and have just given four papers, including a survey paper at the Physical Society Conference here.

[Martyn's discussion of his confusion was subtle if not obscure.] I'm returning early rather than visit the Continent again. Things are getting very touchy there at present, as several delegates found to their annoyance and concern. That tale had better wait till I return. I have informed Ives in some details and introduced him to the leader of another delegation.

On 13 September 1954, he returned to Australia House for two days of meetings. Likely, he met McCarthy during the period. The main activity was a medical conference on 14 September organised by Dr J. Bryan Mathieson. McCarthy had told Ives that the High Commission:

considered that Dr Martyn should be interviewed by a psychiatrist before being allowed to board an aircraft to return to Australia. Mr McCarthy [of the Australian High Commission] and [Ives] agreed that this would have to be done very carefully so that Martyn would not be given the impression that he was considered to be in an unbalanced state. [But based on a doctor's certificate received earlier from a doctor], together with the observations made by Pawsey and [Ives], indicates that there is reasonable justification for allowing Martyn to return home at the earliest possible moment.

Ironically, after the interview on 14 September 1954, Ives reported that Martyn had figured out that the man introduced as a "consultant to assist the medical officer" was in fact a psychiatrist.

The interview occurred on the following day (14 September), with a well-known Harley street psychiatrist Dr Henry Yellowlees, accompanied by Mathieson, the Chief Medical Officer. Mathieson [of the High Commission] was not optimistic: "... [A]lthough there has been some improvement, [the consultant] considers that improvement only apparent and temporary and that the outlook for the future is far from good."

Mathieson continued with his own opinion:

... Dr Martyn will require close observation by his Department in the future ... I should not advise that he take further overseas trips and that he be spared as much pressure as possible, I think he should be under the care and supervision of a psychiatric specialist and that his future association with his Department should be determined by his medical fitness.

The final report (14 September 1954) from Yellowlees to Mathieson continued the pessimistic assessment of Martyn's mental state:

There can be no doubt that Dr Martyn ... is suffering from a paranoid psychosis. As you know, I am of the opinion that he is fit to travel ... His delusional ideas are fairly well systematised and when we examined him, there was no evidence of hallucinations. Instead of suspecting that enemy agents were on his track and were poisoning his food and drink, as he did in the earlier and more acute phase of his illness, he now says that he thinks he was merely being subjected to a very drastic and unpleasant "security check" which was justifiable enough and which is something he has gone through on previous occasions. He says he thinks this is now over, and that while in Scotland and since his return thence to London, he has not been troubled in any way.

Since a paranoid patient often appeared to benefit from a change of environment, the doctor thought a return to Australia was a good idea.

Unfortunately, such improvement is only apparent and temporary, and I ... have no doubt that after Dr Martyn has settled down to work again in Australia, his suspicions and delusional fancies will again reassert themselves. I feel, however, that any trouble on the journey is so extremely unlikely that to allow him to go is the course in the best interests of everyone concerned ... [A]ny attempt to delay or prevent his departure would raise a multitude of fresh doubts and suspicions ... whereas Dr Martyn is now in a relieved and happy state of mind, anxious to get home, and confident that his troubles are over.

On the same day, Walter Ives wrote a handwritten letter of relief to Clunies Ross. He told the CSIR Chairman that it was desirable that Martyn return as the psychiatrist was of the opinion that "his condition will develop but the trend would be worsened by his staying overseas any longer." For Walter Ives, Martyn was basically "quite an unbalanced person and the medicos consider that his condition is progressive." Ives was fed-up: "I must confess I have had all I can take of him. Thus, in another week **I'd have had to visit a psychiatrist myself.**" He was pleased that the problem would now be in the hands of the CSIRO management in Australia. Ives did express his sympathy to White and Clunies Ross since they would now have to deal with Martyn: "I am afraid it places a very heavy responsibility on you ..." ²⁸

Another theme expressed by David Martyn had also been picked up by Walter Ives on at least two occasions. David Martyn's dislike of CSIR/CSIRO, with origins in 1941, was a prominent topic of conversation. In the letter to Clunies Ross of 14 September 1954, Ives reported:

DF has spent hours telling me of the way he has been persecuted by almost everyone in CSIRO since 1939: he seems to have a fierce hatred of many of our people [including White and Madsen from the war and Bowen from the post-war era]. He obviously

²⁸ Ives to Clunies Ross, 1 October 1954. In informal report to Clunies Ross, Ives repeated the praise attributed to Pawsey about the Cambridge ionospheric conference: "... Pawsey says Martyn's was the outstanding contribution ..."

enjoys such authority as he has as Physical Secretary of the [Australian Academy of Science, presumably with an opportunity to settle old scores].²⁹

On his return to Sydney on 19 September 1954, Martyn denied to White and Clunies Ross that he had been ill at all. Clunies Ross wrote Ives on 7 October 1954:

He persists in his story that, while he may have been unduly apprehensive, in fact everything was due to the "Security" pressures imposed on him, and cites support of this the very full programme he carried out in Cambridge prior to his departure from [London]. He wrote to me, expressing some indignation that White had referred to his illness when, in fact, he said there had been no such thing and also expressing the opinion that you [Ives] could not have given us any impressions that he was ill ... I can well imagine how extremely difficult it must have been for you to handle Martyn in the state of mind in which he then was.

Clunies Ross concluded by telling Ives that the Camden project (the Upper Atmosphere Division that was created for Martyn, including a house for the Martyns on the CSIRO property) would continue. Clunies Ross thought the cancelation of the project would have "a disastrous effect on Martyn, while there is ... no indication at all that his technical competence is in any way affected."

The final correspondence concerning the Martyn breakdown of August-September 1954 was an exchange of letters between Fred White and Ives. The letter from White from 7 October is not available while the response from Ives on 15 October is in the Martyn PH file ("Dear Fred"). Ives responded to Clunies Ross on 15 October ("Dear Sir Ian"), continuing his assessment of Martyn:

These reports [from the doctors in London] led me to believe that whether there had been a security check on Martyn or not, there is grave reason to feel that he needs medical attention. That ... is clear, whatever may have been the facts about the persecution he claims to have endured while over here. [The main problem] ... is to find any effective means of helping Martyn to help himself.

Then a surprising statement from Ives, as Martyn had written to Ives just after White visited Martyn in Sydney. "[This correspondence illustrates] ... the point of view which he [Martyn] was continually expressing to me while he was in London. Martyn feels that he has never had

²⁹ Earlier in the year, Martyn had played a major role in the inauguration of the Australian Academy of Science by the Queen on 16 February 1954 in Canberra, a joint initiative with Mark Oliphant. Minnett and Robertson (1996) in their Australian Academy of Science Biographical Memoir of White (1905-1994) have reported: "White's many contributions to Australian science during his years in CSIR(O) were recognised in 1960 by his election to the Fellowship of the Australian Academy of Science. A previous nomination in 1954 had been strongly opposed by Martyn, then an executive member of the Academy Council, for reasons that were at least in part a rationalisation of his remembered wartime animosity." In 1966, White was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society.

proper recognition of his ability and that he never will get it in CSIRO. Perhaps it would be best if you tore the letter when you read it.”³⁰

Sydney Morning Herald Article of 28 July 1954³¹

A related event occurred on 28 July 1954 with the publication in the *Sydney Morning Herald* by the article prepared by Fred White, CEO of CSIRO; likely White had the assistance of one or both of Arthur Higgs and Lindsay McCreedy. The article was entitled “Australia Leads in Radio-Astronomy”, a clear attempt to raise funds from the Australian public after the seed grant of \$250,000 to the proposed new GRT (21 May 1954, see chapter 27 and NRAO ONLINE 40). The letter was sent from ASLO (Australian Scientific Liaison Office) in London on 11 August 1954, only a month after Pawsey’s arrival in the UK and a few weeks before the URSI conference in the Netherlands. Clearly Martyn had spent quite some time preparing a thorough complaint.

From Martyn’s point of view, the anger was clear-cut: “[I] must register a strong protest against your statement that ‘Radio-astronomy’ has been created ‘by the highly original researches of the Division of Radiophysics of CSIRO and by a complementary group of scientists of Manchester and Cambridge, in England.’”

Martyn was aware that the purpose of the article was “propagandising Radiophysics, with a view to securing public finance for a big telescope, to the tune of some £300,000. The problem was that all the work was presented as arising from RPL –with no mention at all of the Radio Research Board. The claim was made that the total support for the RRB from CSIR and CSIRO in the past 25 years was only equivalent to the support by CSIRO for RPL for only three months in a given year. Thus the work of the RRB was credited to RPL and “thus you not only fail to support us, but even further cutting the ground from under our feet” since the RRB was, unlike most CSIRO entities, dependent on support from industries like AWA. Martyn then listed six areas in which the RRB (in particular in most cases himself at the Commonwealth Observatory in Canberra) had contributed to solar radio astronomy and ionospheric research.

One example was the concept of the “quiet sun” prediction, with the remarkable suggestion that the million degree corona would be observed at metre wavelengths. (see Chapters 12 and 14). Another example was the prediction of the effects of magnetic storms on the ionosphere, a key contribution to the post-war ionosphere community. Martyn then dug the knife in deeper: “All the above points refer to pioneering work in radio-astronomy ... Of course in the past few years the RRB and the Commonwealth Observatory have yielded to your expressed desire that they give up radio-astronomy, “to avoid duplication of effort”.

³⁰ Ives first told Clunies Ross that he was enclosing the angry letter from Martyn; in the main text of the letter he wrote: “Normally, correspondence like this is best destroyed ...” Then in a footnote told Clunies Ross: “Decided not to send the letter. Martyn doesn’t want to have to apply for sick leave”, that is Martyn did not want to admit he had been ill.

³¹ From CSIRO archives, KE20/2. (From Rob Birtles)

To correct all the misunderstanding, Martyn suggested that a new article be written “extolling the work of the Board”. He pointed out that there was no Australian praise for the RRB, but “we have had no lack of recognition abroad”.

Fred White was in no hurry to reply when the letter was received on 19 August 1954; he was apparently on travel and he wrote on the letter (for Clunies Ross and Bastow): “haven’t answered yet – will do so on my return.” Clunies Ross has written on the letter “Dr White noted you will postpone action now”. Within a week of the receipt of the letter, Martyn’s collapse in The Hague had been reported. For the next months, the CSIRO was busy sorting out Martyn, getting him back to Australia from the UK and facilitating the move to his new institute at Camden. There are no records of further correspondence; perhaps in the chaos of Martyn’s breakdown in 1954, White and Clunies Ross forgot about the SMH article, in spite of the strong validity of Martyn’s just complaints.

1956

In the period April-May two years later, Martyn had a recurrence of the delusions and paranoia; again he thought “people were following him”. At this time, Jack Piddington and Bob Duncan intervened as explained above. By 6 June 1956, Guy Gresford (the well-known Secretary of Industrial and Physical Sciences of CSIRO and the right hand man of Fred White) wrote Piddington with the names of two psychiatrists in Sydney (Kerrige and Swanton, offices in Macquarie Street). These medicos had been recommended by a leading psychiatrist in Melbourne, likely an acquaintance of Clunies Ross and White. Gresford:

I understand from [Stewart] Bastow that you are now looking after DF Martyn’s affairs ... As you know, Martyn became ill when he was in England in 1954. This caused considerable worry, and as well as consulting the Chief Medical Office at Australia House it was necessary to refer the case to a psychiatrist [Yellowlees].

The Melbourne consultant had seen the reports from 1954 and these were now sent on to Piddington. “These documents may be useful in discussing the case with the psychiatrist in Sydney. Gresford reported that George Munro had become the acting Officer-in-Charge at the Upper Atmosphere Section.

A month later (6 July) Gresford wrote the newly appointed Chief Scientific Liaison Officer in London, Abner Shavitsky, (who had recently replaced Walter Ives). Dr Allan Martyn had sent a cable to CSIRO in Melbourne inquiring about his brother’s health. Gresford replied that on 6 July 1956, DF Martyn would be released from the hospital; the shock treatment was completed. Gresford predicted that he would be able to return to work within two months. Jack Piddington was to be in London on 27 July 1956 and could give a personal report to Allan Martyn, “since Piddington has had such close personal ties with DF.”

Also on 6 July, Gresford wrote Allan Martyn telling him about Pddington's imminent visit to the UK; he continued:

... [T]he outlook is now much better than we had hoped when DF first became ill. He had been suffering from a paranoid psychosis and you will remember that he showed similar symptoms of this when he was in England in 1954. Over the last two or three months he has had some trouble and about the beginning of June was persuaded to seek medical advice. Since that time he had been undergoing treatment by one of the leading men in Sydney and apparently has responded much better than was at first hoped. The position now he is to leave hospital today. He will be an outpatient for about a month, after which he will have month's further leave. The psychiatrist believes he should then be ready to resume his duties.

On 3 July, Margot Martyn, David's wife, wrote Stewart Bastow of the CSIRO Executive. She had taken a flat in Sydney (distance from Camden about 60 km) for some time while DF was an out-patient. She told Bastow that the doctors suggested that DF take at least two months additional sick leave, "but better to take three months from now". She wrote:

During the last week David seems to have become completely normal- he has forgotten all his delusions and is simply trying to work out logically what has brought him to this pass. On the doctor's advice, I have told him that he thought he had people following him ... but not any of the details. [In any future discussions], the doctor does not want the word "paranoia" mentioned to him- apparently that is in David's mind as he has mentioned that himself to the doctor... I have told him that you [CSIRO] have all been very sympathetic and this is on sick leave ... I will keep you informed of how things are going.

Apparently, yet another episode of paranoia occurred; this has been described by Cockburn and Ellyard (1981). In a series of undated events, they have written:

... [H]is sense of hurt and grievance at what happened to his career [some] years earlier was not assuaged. Towards the end of his life his eccentricities became more marked. At one stage he began to imagine that his "enemies" were trying to injure or kill him with some form of radiation. So he had radiation detectors mounted in his laboratory and office. He shot himself in 1970.